Stardate
20020914.2050 (Captain's log): In communications theory, we have a problem trying to explain what "information" is, and why some things which are transmitted are information or are not information. The reason that's important is that information is subject to strict laws derived from mathematics and from physics, as formulated by Papa Shannon. (Claude Shannon's development of information theory has to be one of the most amazing intellectual tour-de-force's in history. Before Shannon's paper, the field didn't exist. Shannon didn't just lay out the concepts, put together a few bones, and suggest how others should work to flesh it out. Shannon's paper presented a complete scientific theory, fully developed and ready to be converted into engineering practice.)
As a general rule of thumb, the intuitive answer for determining what is or is not information is whether it involves surprise. If you already know what's coming, it ain't information. (Which is why the CDMA spreading code isn't information; both sides already know what it is.)
Most political speeches contain essentially no information. Between general predictions and analysis, and leaks to the press ("Today, the President will say thus-and-so in a speech"), by the time the speech is actually made, it's rare for it to catch anyone by surprise.
In the last few months, President Bush has made two critical speeches about international affairs that have actually contained information, as demonstrated by the way others, especially around the world, were rocked back on their heels and forced to think fast. Each time, the content of the speech was well considered and looks very likely to accomplish what Bush and his advisors wished it to.
The first of those was Bush's now-legendary speech about the Palestinians in June. Going into it, the expectation was that it would be yet another condemnation of violence on both sides, yet another demand for Israeli withdrawal and Palestinian cessation of terrorist attacks, yet another attempt to try to maintain some semblance of even-handedness, yet another attempt to try to set the US up as a mediator in the dispute. The governments of Europe all had their responses prepared, praising the US for its commitment to negotiation.
What he actually said, shorn of the diplo-speech, was that Arafat was the problem, and that there could be no peace in the region as long as Arafat remained in power, and that until such time as the Palestinians actually held honest elections and elected a truly representative government, eschewed terrorism, reduced corruption, instituted the rule of law with real courts that actually administered justice, and sent Arafat to a well-deserved retirement, then further negotiations was a waste of time, and the US didn't intend to be involved in such things. Henceforth, American policy would be to refuse to talk to Arafat at all, but to encourage the Palestinians as much as possible to move in this direction. AND, he didn't expect Israel to withdraw until after the Palestinians had made substantive progress in this direction. He said that the Palestinians had to make the first move, that it had to be a good one, and that they would be judged henceforth on actions and not on words.
The response from around the world was somewhere between stunned silence and total outrage. The immediate reaction from Europe was on the order of "We'll have to study this and get back to you", which proved that Bush's speech had made their prepared statements obsolete in an instant.
And yet, after years of stalemate, double-dealing, pointless death and destruction, and failed attempt after failed attempt to negotiate some sort of diplomatic agreement, there is finally reason to believe that the situation there is actually going to improve. Arafat really was the problem, and once someone somewhere whose opinion really mattered was willing to stand up and say that peace was impossible as long as Arafat remained in power, then his sun started to set. It looks like the great survivor has finally met a challenge he can't survive. For the first time in many years, the Palestinians themselves are beginning to work to reduce his power. The Palestinian parliament is in open revolt, and they just forced Arafat's cabinet to resign. Arafat's attempt to promise elections without really promising elections (by making them conditional on an Israeli withdrawal) was rejected not by the US, not by Israel, but by the Palestinian parliament.
However, there were two other reasons why I think that speech by Bush was so important. First was that it was yet another slap in the face of the Europeans, hoping that Bush would be willing to become more multilateralist. Bush broke all the rules with that speech. He didn't consult with them first. He didn't give them any warning. He didn't let them try to talk him out of it. Part of the stunned silence in Europe was due to the realization that everything had fundamentally changed, permanently changed, and they had a lot of catching up to do.
And it was also important strategically and militarily. One of the strategies Iraq was using to try to prevent us from attacking was to try to convince as many people as possible to support the idea that any attack on Iraq should be deferred until after the situation in Israel had been straightened out. At the same, Iraq was doing everything in its power to try to encourage disorder there and to try to make a solution there impossible. By so doing, Saddam hoped to tangle Bush up in a real quagmire, a diplomatic one which has entangled many presidents before him. In June, Bush made clear that he wasn't going to play that game, and that planning for an attack against Iraq would not be conditional on what happened in Israel.
And now we've witnessed another speech by Bush which actually contained information. And again, the initial reaction by the leaders of the world has made clear that they were caught by surprise.
I sure didn't predict it. I knew the speech would lay out reasons why Iraq was dangerous, in an attempt to justify war, but I never saw the core of the speech.
It was brilliant. In fact, it approached genius. In fifteen minutes, Bush completely changed the entire world diplomatic landscape regarding Iraq and how the nations of the world think about Iraq and think about America's threat to attack Iraq.
What was brilliant about it was, of course, how by emphasizing Iraq's long history of flaunting UN resolutions, Bush managed to make the case that people who claimed to believe in internationalism and multilateralism and the power of international institutions over individual nations should, because of that, approve of an attack on Iraq by the US.
Until Bush started speaking, all those believing in internationalism were completely focused on the US as the world's most important rogue nation. Bush's key point was that if internationalists somehow managed to prevent us from dealing with Iraq, then the internationalists were rewarding Saddam for his much more blatant denial of internationalism, and that the only way to keep the UN relevant was for it to approve of war.
The key point of the speech was to prove that every possible approach to Iraq short of war had already been tried and that they had all failed miserably. There had been condemnations. There had been fierce scowls aimed at Iraq. There had been sanctions. There had been attempts at diplomacy.
And in saying all of this, he made clear that this was a watershed test for the UN. But he didn't promise to actually subordinate American policy to UN decisions, and made clear that America still reserved the option of acting unilaterally in this, if the UN didn't live up to its responsibility.
In the two days since then, the majority of the world's leaders have stopped looking at the US and started looking at Iraq. The chorus of denunciations of us has declined to almost nothing (with a couple of notable exceptions). But the pressure on Iraq has climbed palpably.
The world's leaders have stopped asking each other "What are we going to do about the US?" and started asking each other "What are we going to do about Iraq?" It's a stunning achievement, a masterstroke.
And, in fact, I'm being deeply surprised by something else. At one time I thought that there was zilch chance of the US actually getting a Security Council authorization for attack. Now I think there's a reasonable chance that it will happen. (Not, mind, that I think it's essential, but it would be helpful diplomatically to have it.)
After Bush's speech in June about the Palestinians, and the surprise it caused, I think people are being a bit more careful about releasing early reactions to this one. In June, there were attempts (especially, as usual, in Europe) to try to spin Bush's speech in ways more to their liking, only to have clarifying comments come from Washington (via Condi Rice and Colin Powell, among others) which made very clear that the spinning was wrong and that Bush really did mean that he wasn't going to negotiate with Arafat any more.
But you're still seeing a bit of attempt (from Europe) to try to spin Bush's UN speech. For instance, representatives of the EU yesterday "welcomed Bush's commitment to seek the United Nations imprimatur". Only he made no such commitment, and today he said so. He made a speech laying an obligation on the UN, but he didn't commit to following UN orders, and today he made clear that he definitely intended to take care of Iraq whether the UN approved or not.
Which was the real point of his speech on Thursday: the UN does not have the ability to affect whether there will be an attack. But the UN does have the ability to make itself meaningless, and it better not do so.
It was, in fact, yet another manifestation of "Either you're with us or you're against us." (Another thing Bush hasn't given up, despite the hopes of others that he'd come to his senses.)
Perhaps more impressive has been the sea change in the Arab world. They still hope to avoid a war, but they now know that there isn't any way to convince Bush to give up his plans for attack unless they can give him something (other than empty claims of friendship), and so the Arab nations are now saying, in so many words, that Iraq must accept inspections again. Really accept them, all the way accept them, which means Saddam giving up his ambition to have WMDs.
You're also seeing the Arab ranks breaking. Egypt's Mubarek says that he'd approve of an attack on Iraq if it was made with UN approval.
In the mean time, France has stopped saying "No!" and started saying "Maybe". Russia has publicly admonished Iraq. The Chinese are staying above it all and being dispassionate, but they're saying that UN resolutions must be obeyed, which is really bad news for Saddam.
What you had, coming up to Thursday, was a lot of governments who outright supported Iraq, and a lot of others who didn't so much support Iraq as oppose us, and you had most of the world opposing war. Everything changed on Thursday.
In fact, hardly anyone now is saying anything which might be even slightly supportive of Iraq. It's a very short list.
First, there's Cuba. As the nation whose government is perhaps least friendly to our own anywhere in the world, after forty years of diplomatic standoff, the Cuban government has little to lose, and it's an opportunity to tweak the gringos, so why not take it?
The Palestinians still support Iraq. Hardly surprising, really, since Saddam has been pouring money into the Palestinian territories to support their terrorism. (For instance, since Israel started bulldozing the homes of families of suicide bombers, Iraq has increased the payments to them to compensate, and will be giving a lot of money to any other Palestinian whose home is destroyed by Israel.)
So it's not really surprising that Hizbollah came out condemning the US on this. But it's also not necessarily helpful.
And... there's our good friends in Germany, where Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Fischer are locked in a major campaign and may be in big trouble. That's especially true for Fischer, who heads the Greens, and who is expected to be the big loser in this election. Even if Schröder is able to form a new government, Fischer probably won't be a big part of it. In the mean time, as a way of pandering to the German left, Schröder is actually considering the possibility of denying the use of German airbases and German airspace to the US in case of war. (Which would mean the end of NATO.)
The opposition of the German government to all this, even now, is approaching the sordid. It's not just that those leading the government are making these decisions in part because of electoral concerns, but also because it looks as if their primary worry is the economic effect an Iraqi war will have on Germany. I can't find the reference, but one of them said that an Iraqi war was the only thing which could derail a German economic recovery.
They're entitled to be worried about that. But if their opposition to our plans for Iraq is entirely selfish, then they're in no position to lecture us for not being internationalist. And in the mean time, I do wonder how the German electorate feels about the company that their leaders are now keeping. (Hizbollah and Fidel Castro are nice people.)
And all of this is paying off big time in the one arena he really does care about and cannot afford to lose: the opinions of American voters. Support for an attack on Iraq remains strong, and after his speech it is strengthening.
And around the world it has finally sunk in: Bush doesn't care what they all think. Months of public condemnations and abuse have rolled off him like water off the back of a duck; his apparent inaction was simply because the US wasn't logistically ready to act and had nothing to do with their attempts to dissuade him. They're realizing something important: they can be on the train, or dragged behind it, or fall under its wheels. But they can't stop it.
One diplomatic masterstroke might be luck. Two in close succession can only be the result of supreme skill. After a year of mocking characterizations of Bush as an iggorant cowboy from Texas, will the leaders of the world finally wake up to the fact that they're dealing with a very smart team?
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